Libertarian Free Will: Does This View Uphold Human Responsibility?

Libertarian Free Will (Indeterminism), the view held by the majority of people today, sets forth the notion that the human will is completely autonomous. In other words, the human will is completely free from any determining factors (including personal motives, inducements, or the person's settled character). The human will is seen as acting "independently of determining causes or influences, whether they be external or internal." (Nash, Ronald H., Life's Ultimate Questions, 329) This is the "Arminian" view of the human will that is taken to its logical conclusions (or nearly) by "Open Theists."

Nash tells us that there are two views of human liberty. One is the liberty of indifference, and the other is the liberty of spontaneity. The liberty of indifference is the view advocated by libertarian proponents. Human freedom in this view is "the ability either to do something or not." (Nash 327) The liberty of spontaneity is "the ability to do whatever the person wants to do." (328) This is the view of freedom upheld by compatiblists (those who believe determinism and human free will can both be true at the same time--incompatibilists are those who believe determinism and human free will cannot coexist at the same time--this is the libertarian model).

In liberty of spontaneity, humans do what it is that determining factors (internal causes--such as inducements, settled character, or motives) cause the person to do--it is what the person wants to do. Liberty of indifference, on the other hand, the human agent has the ability to make decisions without them being caused by any prior conditions--it is the "equal ability, under given circumstances, to choose either of two courses of action. No antecedent power determins the choice." (329).

In libertarian free will, human actions, because they have no antecedent determining factors, internal or external, are therefore not conditioned upon "any prior condition, state, thought, feeling, emotion, or whatever... ask yourself, how does this kind of uncaused action differ from pure chance?" (330).

The fact is, this type of freedom is just that: pure chance. It is random. Therefore, since it is random (unavoidable and unexplainable), this is not an act of free choice, and it is not responsible conduct. Yes, that is correct, Libertarian Free Will leaves humans unresponsible for their actions. So consistency in this view, requires that in Genesis 3 when Adam and Eve ate from the fruit, because they were acting in libertarian freedom, they were not responsible for their actions. Why? Because their action was not caused by them, but by a completely chance response of the will to outside stimuli.

But, I have never heard anybody actually hold to this. Rather, when faced with this issue, those who seek libertarian freedom will say something along the lines of "they wanted to do it." But wait, there is your determining factor: Desire--an internal motivation/character trait. Thus, those who adopt this view must modify it and accept some type of determinism. God cannot rightfully judge those who did not act out of their own volition (though I have heard people say that determinism leads to people not acting from their own volition--this however, is a misunderstanding of the will). Thus, the will never acts from a completely neutral state.

Compatibilism (in some sense) is therefore the only tenable option (there are serious issues with complete determinism with the denial of the human's willing as well). "Free and responsible behavior must be conduct that can be causally traced back to my inner states. Erratic and impulsive behavior and random behavior is neither free nor responsible." (Nash, 331) Though I have not quoted the Bible here, this is what the Bible teaches (I should have a post coming soon about Open Theism that touches more on this).

What has this accomplished? Well, I've shown (thanks to Mr. Nash, who I'm sure would give God all the credit) that true libertarian free will is untenable. Though libertarian free will was conjured up for the purpose of making humans responsible for their actions, it actually negates their responsibility. Thus it follows that Arminians and Calvinsts fall into the same camp when it comes to the so called "problem of evil." Every human action (seriously, every single one) flows from some cause/influence. What is the determining cause of Adam and Eve's sin in the garden? I could make conjectures, but I do not feel that this is the proper time (so don't bring this question up in any of your responses to this post--I won't answer it).

Let us also not forget that the fall served a greater purpose: Through the fall, Jesus has become the new Adam, and therefore the Lord of all. The greatest of evils (the foreordained death of the Son of God at the hands of sinful men--cf. Acts 2:22-36; 4:23-31) was meant by God to bring about the greatest of goods, namely, the exultation of Jesus Christ, the righteous.

I leave you with Paul's infallible proposition in Romans 9:

So then [God] has mercy on whom He desires, and He hardens whom He desires.

You will say to me then, "Why does He still find fault? For who resists His will?"

On the contrary, who are you, O man, who answers back to God? The thing molded will not say to the molder, "Why did you make me like this," will it? Or does not the potter have a right over the clay, to make from the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for common use? What if God, although willing to demonstrate His wrath and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction? And He did so to make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He prepared beforehand for glory, even [Christians], whom He also called, not from among Jews only, but also from among Gentiles. (Romans 9:18-24)